Friday, 18 November 2016

Desalination



Figure 1: Bohai Bay Plant site near industrial city of Tangshan 

The picture above shows the site for a proposed new seawater desalination plant. This plant, costing $1.1 billion, is located 200 km southeast of water scarce Beijing and will have the potential to provide for one third of the capitals total household water needs via a pipeline direct to the city (Larson,2015). The facility, which is located in Bohai Bay, was originally supposed to be completed by 2019 and is intended to help China reach its 2020 target of achieving a desalination capacity of three million tons of fresh water per day (Sun, 2016).

This was what the government intended in 2014, but since then progress on the project has been limited. While it has secured approval from regional and national governments and is still held up as one of China’s major initiatives to help battle water scarcity in the north, major construction on this project is yet to begin.

After some early success in desalination, with China managing to increase its desalination capacity by 70% yearly from 2006 to 2010, they began to miss targets and progress slowed (Gleick, 2013). In 2014 they produced 2.2 million tons of desalinated water a day, just missing their target of 2.6 million tons and then by the end of 2015 their capacity had dropped to just 1.03 million tons a day (Larson, 2015).

This is an issue that demands immediate attention as government stats suggest that by 2030, costal areas will have water shortages totalling 21.4 billion cubic meters (Sun, 2016). China however faces many challenges in order to improve its desalination capacity. One of which is the energy intensive nature of desalination that results in desalinated water being both environmentally and economically expensive. As a result building large desalination projects is not the most attractive prospect for local governments and residents who are forced to pay high prices for their water. Wang Zhi, director of desalination technology says that “When there is a drought, local officials and enterprises all come to see us and say, ‘We want to desalinate seawater, but if there is sufficient rainfall the next year, they will drop the idea and invest their money in other things first.”

Demand then for new projects is inversely proportional to fluctuations in ground and surface water resources. If for example natural water resources are high then seawater desalination projects are often put on hold.

A new policy was introduced a few years ago by the Chinese government in an attempt to prioritise freshwater resources. It stated that in certain costal areas new industrial facilities which are deemed water intensive may not make use of local surface water resources but will have to provide their own. This is why 60% of the water produced by desalination is used in industry (Walker, 2015).

The South North Water Diversion Project that I discussed in my previous post has reduced the importance of desalination projects in the north. But the many drawbacks of the mammoth diversion project have caused some environmentalists and academics to question the sustainability of the project that has displaced thousands and caused an unprecedented level of environmental destruction. The choice between water transfer and desalination is complex, as any major new desalination project must also be designed to minimise its environmental impact. The director of the Centre for Clean Water and Clean Energy at MIT, John Lienhard, claims that this can be achieved by “diluting and diffusing the concentrated salt water discharged back into the sea after the fresh water has been extracted”.

While this process of desalination may help increase the water resources of the dry north it comes at a considerable economic and environmental cost. This then begs the question of whether this is yet another one of China’s grandiose engineering projects that they are so fond of. Is desalinating water the solution to China’s crisis? Probably not, it’s just not a sustainable practice; the plants just put too much stress on local ecosystems and increases the demand for water and coal. Many critics claim that major projects such as these distract from the more important goals of improving conservation of resources, efficiency and cutting carbon emissions (Watts, 2011).

Wednesday, 2 November 2016

The South-to-North Water Diversion Project

My first post discussed many of the issues surrounding China’s water security, however recent scrutiny of China’s over-reliance on coal for energy production has revealed that an alarming amount of water is consumed by this industry. As the population continues to grow and modernise demands for energy are expected to increase drastically. While China has made significant improvements in the amount of energy it draws form renewable sources, over a quarter of this new energy is expected to come from coal.

Figure 1: Coal mine in Inner Mongolia
 Source: Cho, 2011

12% of national water resources are consumed by coal industries through its processing, mining and combustion. This figure is expected to rise to 17% by 2020, with coal-fired plants using around 34billion m3 of water per year by themselves (IRENA, 2014). The issue is one of a spatial nature as the coal resources lie in the dry northern and western provinces that are already considered water scarce. Ma Jun, author of China’s Water Crisis and Director of the institute for Public and Environmental Affairs, in an interview with Circle of Blue, claimed that if this water-energy problem is not resolved, then there could be devastating consequences for energy security, public health, global relations, biodiversity and even social stability.

Over the last decade as new reports such as this are published and the full extent of China’s water shortage becomes apparent, there has been an increase in political pressure from the international community on both supranational and national levels for China to take action. The numerous media outlets and academic studies that have commented on the problem have also helped ramp up this pressure. When it is published that 24,000 settlements in North and West China have been abandoned over the last 5 decades due to desertification, then it creates a host of other issues for the central government, other than the water shortage itself (Brown, 2011). One of these being that this sort of press is highly damaging to the carefully crafted geopolitical image that China has made for itself. China’s 21st century image of being the new hyper power on the global stage, the main economic and political rival to the USA is undercut by reports that it can’t manage to provide its own population with clean fresh water.



In an attempt to address both the negative media and the issue of water scarcity itself the Chinese government have moved away from the soft approaches of water conservation and efficiency toward large scale hard engineering projects. They believe that these projects will gain more media traction and help to improve their international image as well as their fresh water resources.


 Figure 2: Water scarcity map of China
Source: Quartz, 2014

One of the biggest issues surrounding China’s water crisis is the spatial and temporal mismatch of resources that I discussed in my first post. Figure 2 clearly shows the disparity between the arid north and relatively water rich south. The solution as Mao Zedong first said in 1952, is to “borrow a little water from the south” (Quartz, 2014). His suggestion was finally taken forward 50 years later in December 2002 as work began on the controversial and imaginatively named South-to-North Water Diversion Project (SNWDP). The project expected to cost a staggering $62billion is the largest of its kind ever attempted. Once it is completed in 2050 they will have essentially created a link between the Yangtze, Yellow, Huaihe and Haihe rivers. It will, once completed divert 44.8 billion cubic meters of water 2,700 miles (the distance between the two coasts of the USA), this represents a reallocation of almost 10% of Chinas total surface water resources (Cheng, et al, 2013). They are planning to divert more water than what currently flows through the River Thames by using a series of canals (the longest in the world); pipelines; pumping stations that could fill Olympic sized pools in minuets; and a giant aqueduct. The Chinese government it seems are taking no half measures.

 Figure 3: Map showing the routes of the SNWDP
Source: Quatrz, 2014

However there are a number of academics, environmentalists and economists who have voiced concerns about the project. They worry that even with the numerous water treatment plants that will run along the course of the canals the diverted water will still be to polluted, especially if further industrialisation takes place along the canal routes (Zhang, 2009). There are also fears that the rivers from which the water is being diverted will also suffer. By removing water and slowing the flow you risk damaging the rivers environmental capacity, its ability to clear out pollution (Zhang, 2009). Also as Climate change continues to create a dryer climate some fear that the southern provinces may soon have water scarcity issues of their own. The project will also damage or destroy hundreds of culturally valuable archaeological and religious sites as well as displacing almost a half million people.

Considering the extent of the human and environmental costs of this project it raises the question is this truly worth it just for a 10% reallocation in water. It has been described as a “high-risk gamble” as instead of displaying the power and strength of the central government it may well have the opposite effect and highlight the governments glaring inadequacies in managing and resolving China's water crisis. (Feng, et al, 2007)

Of the SNWDP, Ma Jun said, “this extra volume will only delay the coming of the crisis a little bit. It will not really resolve the whole problem…it cannot fill out even the current, existing gap, let alone that much bigger gap in the future, unless we do something very, very different in our water governance.” (Circle of Blue, 2011)

It is clear then that this is not going to solve China’s water problem, and they know this as the head engineer of the project said that “for now, the transfer project is just compensating an amount. It can’t completely fix the problem” (Quartz,2014). However you must consider the position they are in, with conservation and efficiency projects failing to have the desired effect, the central government has been forced to take action.



Figure 4: Canal of the SNWDP
Source: Quartz, 2014

Wednesday, 26 October 2016

Water Conservation and Efficiency

Agricultural water
65% of China’s water is used in agriculture and this means that shortages in vital grain producing areas threaten the food security of the nation (BBC news, 2014). To address this issue there has been a great deal of investment into new technologies to enhance the efficiency of irrigation techniques. There were also a number of reforms in water management and prices with an entirely new fee collection system having been implemented (Lohmar, et al, 2003). While there may have been significant progress made in China’s quest for water security, compared to other nations China’s agricultural water use efficiency is still considerably low.

Industrial water
Over the last thirty years China has experienced extremely high rates of economic and industrial growth, this growth has led to a significantly larger portion of China’s water being allocated to the industrial sector: increasing from 10% to 23.2% between 1980 and 2006 (Wang, et al, 2009). China’s response has been to push forward the implementation of new technologies to increase industrial water, recycling, conversion and reuse. However China’s efforts thus far seem ineffective as reports suggest that industrial water use remains highly inefficient (Wang, et al, 2009). 

Household water
Supplying adequate water in terms of quantity and quality for households is where China faces its toughest challenge. Of China’s 660 cities almost 67% of them face water shortages and 108 cities are classified as being in severe water distress (Cheng et al, 2009). The key to satisfying China’s household water demands lies in water conservation. The Chinese government has undergone a process of strengthening its regulations on water use. They have implemented a quota system in certain cities to reduce water stresses as well as reforming water pricing in an attempt to encourage more sustainable water use in households (Cheng et al, 2009).

Improving the situation
Enhancing water use efficiency has been the government’s primary way of addressing the countries water scarcity in the previous decade. A comprehensive policy program was set forth in 2005 in order to guide and protect the development and application of new conservation technologies as well as to improve the management of water resources in both administrative and legislative spheres (Cho, 2011). This seems to have had a significant effect as we can see from figure 1 that the water use in 2005 per 10,000 Yuan GDP was approximately 305m3. This figure is three times higher than the world average and six times higher than the U.S. (Gleick, 2013). The water use per 10,000 Yuan GDP has now fallen significantly over the period in which the governments new water conservation policies have been in place. The new figure of just 122m3 represents a vastly improved level of water efficiency and conservation, however it is still quite high in comparison to many other developed countries and is way above the Chinese target who believed they could be lower than 115mby the end of 2010 (Gleick, 2013). The new water-pricing scheme has been very successful as prices rise and fall depending on supply and cost of delivery. This has helped limit the extent of shortages in times of drought but has also raised issues of water inequalities as the rich can afford as much as possible with the poor suffering when resources are low. All major urban areas have now also been fitted with new water saving devices that have contributed significantly to China’s improved efficiency.




Figure 1: Water use per GDP in China from 2003 to 2013 (in cubic meters per 10,000 yuan) 



These improvements in water conservation, reuse and recycling represent the Chinese governments early attempts at addressing the issue of water scarcity, an issue that they had ignored for some time. These efforts still remain at the heart of Chinese water resource policies but more recently in an attempt to address the bad publicity from international media the government has begun to focus more time and resources on large-scale hard engineering technics. I will begin to discuss these large-scale projects next week, as they are vital to understanding China’s current and future approaches to water security.


Wednesday, 19 October 2016

China Uncensored


I wanted to start this week’s blog with a video that sums up nicely the issues that I outlined last week in regards to Chinas shortage of clean fresh water. The video also moves on to comment, quite critically, on Chinas recent efforts to address the water scarcity issue.





While I think it would be wise to consider the potential biases of an American based YouTube channel who’s angle is to be particularly scathing and critical of the CPC, the video does raise some interesting points. In future posts I will be discussing the three gorges dam as well as this proposed North-South diversion project and I will try to give a more balanced assessment.

Saturday, 15 October 2016

The Problem: an Introduction


Hello and welcome to my blog!

Have you ever wondered how a country with over 1.3 billion inhabitants manages to meet water demands of its people?....

Me too! This will be the topic of my blog; over the next few months I will be investigating some of the ways that the Chinese government and other NGO’s are addressing the water shortage. I will be assessing the use of new geoengineering techniques as well as new political policies and practices and what this means for the future of Chinas water security and consequently food security. This assessment will take place through the mediums of books, videos, newspaper articles and academic readings that I find relevant and most importantly interesting. I hope you find this blog to be engaging and informative and I look to reading your comments over the coming months.

Other than just introducing my blog and its aims I wanted to use this first post to outline some of the biggest issues that China faces in its struggle for water security. Quite clearly Chinas mammoth population of over 1.3 billion is a cause for concern. Figure 1 shows the relationship between population and water withdrawals, we can see how the use of water has increased with population and when population peaks as expected in 2030 then the annual per capita renewable freshwater availability will fall to 1760m3, this is just 4% higher than the water stress limit suggested by Falkenmark and Widstrand (1992). The stresses on freshwater supply will be further exacerbated by the rapid economic growth, improved standard of living and increased urbanisation that China is experiencing. 
Figure 1: Chinas water (a) total supply by source from 1997 to 2006; (b) trends in total withdrawal by use categories and population starting in 1980 and projected up to 2030

China also suffers from a common issue of having its water resources located in the “wrong” place and “wrong” time (Cheng et al,2009). There is a spatial and temporal mismatch in the way its water resources are diffused throughout the country. The Northern Chinese provinces as defined by the boundaries of the Yellow, Huai and Hai rivers, contribute significantly to industrial output and GDP and they are home to a third of China’s population, yet only have access to 7.7% of China’s total water resources (Cheng et al, 2009). The Southwest on the other hand receives 21.3% of China’s water while contributing only 0.7% toward GDP, this is in part due to the fact that the northwest receives <50mm of rainfall a year, a considerably small figure especially when compared to the costal regions of the southeast that receive >1600mm a year (Cheng et al, 2009). The Monsoon climate does not help as having the majority of your fresh rainwater fall in the summer makes collecting and utilising it extremely challenging, it also makes China prone to flooding and results in periods of drought.

China’s rapid economic growth and the resulting waste and pollution this generates has only served to compound issues of water scarcity. A great deal of Chinas ground and surface-waters have been polluted as industrial waste and agricultural byproducts as well as municipal waste find there way into rivers and lakes. The statistics are particularly damning as it is estimated that 40% of China’s surface water is fit only for industrial and agricultural use and only half of the country’s major cities meet the standard for drinking water (Gleick, 2013).

These are just some of the challenges China faces in its battle for water security and over the coming months I will begin to assess they’re responses on all political, practical and technological fronts.